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The district court entered its final judgment on October 7, 2014. 
Record (R.) at 1384-1389.1 The Steeds timely filed a notice of appeal on 
November 6, 2014. R. at 1395-1397. This Court has jurisdiction under 
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all record citations are to the record from State v. 
Joan A. Steed, No. 081907873. 
lV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
The Steeds owned a real estate development business. Around 
10 years ago, the Utah State Tax Commission began auditing the 
Steeds' sales tax collection. That audit expanded to include requests 
for the Steeds' tax returns. When those requests repeatedly went 
unanswered, the auditor referred the matter for a criminal 
investigation. The Tax Commission led investigation resulted in 
various criminal charges against the Steeds, including multiple counts 
of failure to file tax returns and tax evasion, and a single count of 
pattern of unlawful activity. See generally State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16, 
,r,r 3-5, 325 P.3d 87. After trial, a jury convicted each of the Steeds of 
three counts of failure to file a tax return and one count of a pattern of 
unlawful activity. Id. ,r 13. 
Though the Steeds disputed criminal liability, they repeatedly 
admitted their failure to file tax returns. Id. ,r 12 ("The Steeds 
conceded multiple times that they earned sufficient income each year 
to trigger the filing requirement."). And after conviction, the Steeds 
and the Tax Commission worked together to agree on the amount of 
taxes (restitution) the Steeds owed, Aplt. Br. at 11; R. 1519 at 5, along 
with the penalties and interests specified and authorized by statute for 
1 
· .tJ 
the late filing and payment of taxes. R. 1306-07; Utah Code§§ 59-1-
401(2)(c), -401(3)(a), -402. 
The district court sentenced Mr. and Mrs. Steed to suspended 
prison terms, jail time, probation supervised by Adult Probation and 
Parole, and imposed fines based on their convictions. R. 959-60; Frank 
Steed R. 1334-35. Then as conditions of probation, the district court 
ordered the Steeds to (among other things): obey the law, timely file all 
tax returns, serve their jail time, pay their criminal fines, pay the 
agreed upon restitution amounts, plus pay 20% of the restitution 
amounts as a penalty, and interest as set forth by statute. R. 961, 
1519 at 5-9; Frank Steed R. 1335. 
In compliance with their probation terms, the Steeds paid (1) the 
criminal fines to the Department of Corrections, (2) the restitution, 
penalties and interest to the Utah State Tax Commission, (3) the 
probation supervision costs to the Division of Adult Probation and 
Parole, and (4) paid money to Wasatch County for the ability to serve 
jail time at the County's jail instead of at the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Aplt. Br. at 3-4; R. 1384-85; R. 1519 at 11 (explaining fines to be paid 
to the Department of Corrections). 
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The Steeds appealed, challenging only their convictions. Steed, 
2014 UT 16, ,r 16. Notably, the Steeds did not challenge the amounts, 
grounds or authority justifying their payment of taxes/restitution, 
penalties, interest, or probation supervision. 
The Supreme Court heard the appeal and reversed "because 
there was insufficient evidence to support the failure-to-file charges as 
ultimately presented in the jury instructions." Steed, 2014 UT 16, ,r 
55. Although the Court concluded "that the State did present 
sufficient evidence of the Steeds' 'intent to evade ... [a] requirement of 
Title 59," that alternative for conviction was not submitted to the jury 
and there "was insufficient evidence to support the two intent 
alternatives that were ultimately submitted." Id. ,r 37. The Court 
therefore reversed and remanded "with instructions to enter a 
judgment of acquittal." Id. ,r 55. 
On remand, the Steeds wanted more than just entry of a 
judgment of acquittal. They also asked the district court to order a 
refund of "all fines, penalties and interest assessed against them ... 
and all costs associated with their incarceration and probation." R. 
1202. The district court granted the Steeds a refund of the criminal 
fines. R. 1386. But the Court denied the motion as to the tax 
3 
L..) 
penalties, interest, and all costs relating to probation supervision and 
time spent at the Wasatch County Jail. R. 1385-88. The district court 
reasoned that there were justifications for the Steeds to pay all of 
those funds independent of their convictions. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court's decision should be affirmed for any one of 
multiple reasons. First, the Steeds cannot argue that payment of the 
disputed funds violates due process because they did not raise the 
issue in their first appeal. They have waived the argument and the 
district court's original order requiring the payments is now 
mandatory. 
Second, the Steeds' refund request exceeds the scope of the 
Supreme Court's mandate, which expressly ordered the district court 
only to "enter a judgment of acquittal." 
Third, none of the entities from which the Steeds want their 
refund are even parties to this matter. Only the State and the Steeds 
are parties to this criminal proceeding. The court cannot order 
refunds from other non-party governmental entities. 
Fourth, the Steeds' due process arguments do not require a 
refund of the tax penalties, interest and probation supervision fees. 
4 
The Steeds paid these amounts as conditions of their probation. And it 
is undisputed that the Steeds owed these amounts independent of the 
convictions. The Steeds repeatedly admitted that they did not file 
their tax returns. And the tax penalties and interest the district court 
ordered the Steeds to pay are clearly authorized as civil penalties by 
Title 59. Likewise, the probation supervision fees are based on the fact 
that Adult Probation and Parole provided tangible services to the 
Steeds and the Steeds avoided further incarceration by choosing 
probation, and the attendant supervision, over prison. 
ARGUMENT 
To state the Steeds' argument is to refute it. According to them, 
due process requires the district court to (1) ignore the Steeds' waiver 
of their issue by failing to raise it in their prior appeal, (2) exceed the 
Supreme Court's specific mandate, (3) order governmental entities 
that are not parties to this proceeding to give money to the Steeds, (4) 
ignore the fact that the Steeds admit they didn't file necessary tax 
returns, and (5) ignore the fact that the Steeds actually owe the 
disputed funds for reasons other than their conviction. As explained 
below, the Steeds' argument should be rejected and the district court's 
decision affirmed. 
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I. The Steeds are barred from asserting an alleged right to 
a return of the funds at issue. 
The Court need not reach the merits of the appeal to affirm the 
district court's decision. The mandate rule bars the Steeds' arguments 
for either one of two related reasons: the Steeds waived the issue by 
not raising it in their appeal and their arguments request relief that 
goes well beyond the Supreme Court's mandate.2 
A. The Steeds waived any challenge to the penalties 
and interest by not raising the issue in their initial 
appeal 
As a condition of probation, the district court ordered the Steeds 
to pay restitution (the back taxes the Steeds and the Tax Commission 
agreed that they owed), "interest at the statutory rate," and a 20% 
penalty composed of 10% for late filing and 10% for late payment. R. 
1306-07; R. 1519 at 5-11. Though the district court did not specify in 
writing that the penalties and interest were derived from the civil 
penalties outlined in Utah Code§ 59-1-401 & -402 for failure to file a 
2 The State briefly raised these issues before the trial court, R. 1286, though 
not to the extent done in this brief. The may nevertheless consider the 
issues. It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm on any ground 
apparent from the record, regardless of whether it was argued in the trial 
court or even on appeal. First Equity Federal, Inc., v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 
UT 56,, 11, 52 P.3d 1137. 
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tax return and non-payment of taxes, that fact was readily apparent to 
all involved. See, e.g., R. 1306-07 (tax commission report outlining the 
amount of taxes, amount and nature of the penalties, and interest the 
Steeds owed). Indeed, the State is not aware of any other basis upon 
which the district court could have imposed the penalties and interest 
(especially after it imposed independent criminal fines as an express 
part of the Steeds' actual sentences). 
But now the Steeds argue that the district court could not 
impose those penalties and fines pursuant to§ 59-1-401 because "the 
trial court is not the Tax Commission" and "including penalties and 
interest in the restitution order" somehow "deprive[d] the Steeds" of an 
opportunity to "challenge those levies." Aplt. Br. at 12-13. 
Of course, the argument overlooks the fact that the Steeds had a 
full and fair opportunity to challenge the civil tax penalties and 
interest in the district court and could, and should, have raised any 
challenges in their direct appeal. Instead, the Steeds challenged just 
their convictions on three grounds: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, 
(2) the constitutionality of Utah's expert notice statute, and (3) the 
trial court's failure to strike the testimony of the State's expert 
witness. Steed, 2014 UT 16, il 16. 
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Accordingly, the Steeds waived any challenge to the tax 
penalties and fees. They don't get a second bite at the apple on remand 
and a subsequent appeal. Unless required otherwise by the appellate 
court's ruling, the mandate rule "dictates that a prior decision of a 
district court becomes mandatory after an appeal and remand." IHC 
Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K Management, Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,I 28, 196 
P.3d 588. As explained below, the Supreme Court's mandate does not 
require or permit the Steeds' requested refund. 
B. The Steeds' request for a refund exceeds the scope 
of the Supreme Court's mandate 
The Steeds' failure to raise, and subsequent waiver of, their 
current arguments in their prior appeal leads to a second problem: the 
request for a refund exceeds the scope of the Supreme Court's 
mandate. Given the issues the Steeds actually raised on appeal, the 
Supreme Court very specifically and narrowly instructed the district 
court "to enter a judgment of acquittal" on remand. Steed, 2014 UT 
16, ,I 56; see also id. ,I 2 ("We therefore reverse each of the Steeds' 
failure-to-file convictions and remand with instructions to enter a 
judgment of acquittal."). The district court had "no discretion whether 
8 
to comply with the mandate." Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 
56, ,I 8, 218 P.3d 583. 
The mandate rule "'dictates that pronouncements of an appellate 
court on legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be 
followed in subsequent proceedings of that case."' Id. ,I 12 (quoting 
Thurston v. Box Elder Cnty., 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995)). 
Both the district court and the parties must honor the appellate court's 
mandate. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ,I 12. As a result, when a judgment is 
affirmed or reversed and remanded with instructions "'to enter a 
particular judgment, the trial court may not permit amended or 
supplemental pleadings to be framed to try rights already settled."' Id. 
(quoting Street v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153, 
158 (1948)). 
Consequently, the mandate rule bars the Steeds' attempt to 
litigate a refund on remand. That is especially true because the 
Steeds failed to raise the issue (or make it apparent in the record from 
the first appeal) and repeatedly conceded that they had failed to file 
tax returns, which the Supreme Court expressly noted along with the 
fact that such a failure triggered "civil penalties" under Utah Code§ 
59-1-401. Steed, 2014 UT 16, ,I,I 12, 22 & n.18. Under these 
9 
circumstances, Ivers makes clear that the mandate rule bars the 
Steeds' arguments on remand. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, , 20 (noting that 
"UDOT's failure to make apparent in the record before Ivers I the 
theory that Arby's had no right of view, its stipulation prior to final 
judgment that no triable issues remained, and the necessary 
implication of Arby's right of view in our ruling in Ivers I prohibit 
UDOT from reframing the issue to its advantage after remand"). 
This Court's decision in J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, also 
demonstrates that the Steeds' arguments are barred by the mandate 
rule. 2007 UT App 88, ,, 15-16, 157 P.3d 822. There, the district 
court ruled that the Smedsruds were the prevailing party in a lien 
foreclosure action and therefore entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 
Id. , 4. The Smedsruds then garnished the fees and costs from 
Pochynok. Id. But the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the district 
court's decision and remanded "for a factual determination of awards 
and offsets [consistent with the findings likely considered and made by 
the jury], followed by a ruling on who is the successful party ... and 
whether an award of attorneys fees . . . is proper." Id. 1 5. 
Back on remand, Pochynok moved to set aside the garnishment. 
Id. ,r 6. This Court held, however, that the issue was not before the 
10 
trial court on remand. Id. 1 15. Notably, the Court reasoned that the 
Supreme Court remanded the case "for one purpose-to have the trial 
court enter findings and conclusion assessing the awards and offsets 
likely considered and made by the jury." Id. 1 16 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). And that remand "did not instruct the trial court to 
order the costs and attorney fees returned." Id. Because the 
Pochynok's garnishment-refund argument went beyond the scope of 
the mandate, this Court did not address the issue. 
The same conclusion applies here. The Supreme Court 
remanded for only one purpose (consistent with the Steeds' arguments 
in that Court)-"to enter a judgment of acquittal"-not to litigate 
returning funds that the Steeds legitimately owed independent of their 
conviction. 
II. The district court lacks authority to compel non-parties 
to refund money to the Steeds 
Ironically, the Steeds' conception of their own due process rights 
would require the district court to violate the due process rights of 
non-parties. The Steeds acknowledge that they paid the funds they 
now want refunded to the Utah State Tax Commission, Wasatch 
County (or its jail), and Adult Probation and Parole, a Division of the 
11 
Utah Department of Corrections. Aplt. Br. at 3-4. Yet none of these 
distinct governmental entities are parties to this this appeal or the 
remand proceedings in district court; nor could they be. This matter 
arises from a criminal case, which only involves the incorporeal State 
of Utah and the Steeds. State v. Lane, 2009 UT 35, ,r 17, 212 P.3d 529 
("Only the State and the defendant are actual parties to a criminal 
t . ") ac 10n. . 
As the Steeds acknowledge, due process at a minimum requires 
that no one can be deprived of property without adequate notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Aplt. Br. at 5; see also Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ,r 50, 299 
P.3d 990. More fundamentally, the district court lacks jurisdiction to 
compel non-parties to pay money to the Steeds. 
Moreover, if the Steeds want a refund from the Tax Commission, 
Utah law outlines the proper procedures and mechanisms they must 
follow. Utah Code§ 59-1-1410(8)(a) (the Tax Commission may not pay 
a refund unless the person files a claim with the Commission within a 
certain amount of time). 
12 
III. The district court's decision does not violate the Steeds' 
due process rights 
In addition to the waiver, mandate and jurisdictional problems 
with the Steeds' due process arguments, their position fails on the 
merit.3 
A. Due process does not require a refund of the tax 
penalties and fees 
The district court correctly denied the Steeds' request to order a 
refund of the tax penalties and interest they paid to the Tax 
Commission. The district court based its decision on several facts: (1) 
the Steeds' admission that their income triggered tax filing 
retirements, (2) the Steeds' failure to timely file tax returns for the 
2003-2008 tax years, (3) the Tax Commission's statutory authority to 
charge penalties and interest, (4) the penalties and interest imposed 
do not hinge on a criminal conviction, and (5) the Steeds collaborated 
with the Tax Commission to agree on the taxes due along with the 
penalties and interest (which are set by statute). R. 1386. 
3 Of course, the State does not represent in this action any of the non-parties 
from whom the Steeds seek refunds. If given the chance to be heard, the 
non-parties may have additional arguments in support of affirming the 
district court's decision. 
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The Steeds don't really contest those facts, nor the accuracy of 
the amounts they were ordered to pay in taxes, penalties, and interest. 
Rather, the Steeds concoct a theory that the district court lost some 
sort of gamble by imposing§ 59-1-401 penalties and interest as an 
inextricable part of the "restitution order" so the Steeds would 
somehow be deprived of any opportunity to "challenge those levies." 
Aplt. Br. at 12-13. When the Steeds were acquitted on appeal, they 
argue, the district court's scheme crumbled along with any 
justification for ordering payment of restitution, penalties and 
interest. Id. 
There are several flaws with that version of events. First, it's 
problematic for the Steeds to argue their acquittal negated any 
justification for paying restitution/taxes while at the same time 
emphasizing that they aren't asking for a refund of their tax 
restitution payments. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. The disconnect between their 
appellate argument and actions concede, at least implicitly, that they 
have an independent legal obligation to pay taxes regardless of any 
criminal convictions or acquittals. See, e.g., Utah Code 59-10-104(1). 
Moreover, the district court noted at the sentencing hearing that the 
Steeds' counsel "agrees that I can order that [the Steeds] pay [taxes 
14 
owed] as a condition of probation" but counsel just did not want any 
such payments called restitution as to tax years unrelated to the 
Steeds' conviction. R. 1519 at 13. 
Likewise, there is also an independent reason for the Steeds to 
pay the tax penalties and interest. The obligation to pay them does 
not depend on a criminal conviction, nor does it depend on a 
restitution order. See, e.g., Utah Code§ 59-1-401(2) to 401(3); id. § -
402; see also Steed, 2014 UT 16, 1 22 (citing§ 59-1-401 while noting 
that "[a] defendant's failure to file without a corresponding intent 
gives rise only to civil penalties, which are much less severe" than 
criminal penalties). The civil penalty is based simply on a percentage 
of the unpaid tax. Id. §§ -401(2)(c), -401(3)(b). The fact here that the 
Steeds and the Tax Commission agreed on the amount of the unpaid 
taxes simply made the restitution/tax amount an easy reference point 
for the penalties and interest. Nothing ties the viability of the 
penalties and interest payments to a "restitution order." 
Moreover, it is unclear what the Steeds mean by "restitution 
order." In reality, the district court ordered, as conditions of probation, 
that the Steeds obey the law, timely file all tax returns, pay restitution 
for certain years, and pay a 20% penalty and interest at the statutory 
15 
rate. R. 961; Frank Steed R. 1336. The Steeds had independent 
obligations to do all of these things anyway. See, e.g., Steed, 2014 UT 
16, 1 30 ("Title 59 also requires residents to file income tax returns 
whenever [certain] income thresholds are met, which the Steeds 
concede were met in this case."). All the acquittal did, in pertinent 
part, was ensure that if the Steeds violated any of these conditions, 
they wouldn't go to prison as a result of the now overturned 
convictions and criminal sentences. The acquittal no more excused the 
Steeds from paying their tax penalties and interest than it excused 
them from obeying the law or timely filing and paying their taxes 
going forward. 
The next problem with Steeds' due process theory is that, as 
noted above, the Steeds were never deprived of any opportunity to 
challenge the restitution amounts, the penalties or the interest. 
Indeed, they have not pointed to one obstacle that conceivably 
hindered them from objecting to the grounds for, or the amounts of, 
the taxes, penalties or interest. Moreover, it's difficult to imagine 
what they could have challenged. They admit to collaborating with the 
Tax Commission to arrive at the correct amounts, and the penalties 
16 
and interest are set by statute. There really wasn't anything for the 
Steeds to complain about. 
In sum, the Steeds do not present a credible due process 
challenge to the district court's refusal to order a refund of the 
penalties and interest. The decision should be affirmed. 
B. Due process does not require the refund of the 
probation supervision fees 
The district court properly refused to order the refund of monies 
the Steeds paid to Adult Probation and Parole as compensation for the 
supervision of their probation. 4 The district court's decision finds 
support in State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and 
State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 53, 56 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
In Parker, two panel members agreed-albeit for different 
reasons-that due process did not require anyone to refund the fees 
the defendant paid for services he received at a rehabilitation facility 
prior to the reversal of his conviction. Parker, 872 P.2d at 1048, 1050 
(Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1051 
(Greenwood, J., concurring in result only with Davis, Judge). Judge 
4 Wasatch County has indicated its intent to file a brief in this matter. The 
State therefore will not address the Steeds request for a refund of fees they 
paid to the County. 
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Davis held that due process required only notice and an opportunity to 
be heard, which Parker had been afforded. Id. at 1050. Judge 
Greenwood held that the fairness considerations undergirding due 
process did not require reimbursement where Parker "received 
something in exchange for his payment" and "avoided incarceration in 
prison." Id. at 1050-51. 
Consistent with Parker, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
subsequently held that a "defendant was not entitled to a refund of the 
costs of probation supervision, even though his conviction was set 
aside and the criminal charge was dismissed, when the State in fact 
provided the supervision service." 887 P.2d at 57. 
All of those considerations from Parker and Walker apply here. 
Adult Probation and Parole did provide actual supervision services to 
the Steeds and they did avoid further incarceration. Due process does 
not demand the refund of the probation-supervision fees. 
In response, the Steeds merely urge the Court to adopt Judge 
Billings' expansive view of due process and the 'incidents of conviction.' 
Aplt. Br. at 18. But Judge Davis aptly highlighted the reasons not to 
start down that slippery slope: 
18 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty I have with expanding the 
"incidents of conviction" for which the State must make the 
defendant whole is its potential application to almost any 
event that may occur as a result of a criminal conviction. 
For example, would the State be required to reimburse 
defendants for fees paid to private rehabilitative facilities 
including vocational schools and hospitals? Would the State 
be required to, in effect, be the insurer for such facilities? 
Would the State be required to reimburse the defendant 
for restitution paid to a victim? Would the State become an 
insurer for those funds as well? Perhaps most importantly, 
the prospect of having to make a convicted criminal whole, 
however remote , may have a chilling effect upon the 
availability and use of rehabilitative services. 
Parker, 872 P.2d at 1049-50. Those concerns still resonate in this case. 
The district court's decision on this issue should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decision 
of the district court. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Bridget K. Romano 
Chief Civil Deputy 
Office of the Utah Attorney 
General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
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